O custo do Brasil

Esses dias estou sem tempo algum para escrever como eu realmente gostaria de fazer.  Então tenho de deixar alguns comentários sobre este vídeo que eu achei há umas semanas.  Também este rascunho não foi revisado, então desculpe já por quaisquer erro ou frase confusa.

Dentre as três pessoas convidadas para conversar nesse programa, tem uma que foi muita falante.  Ele foi o primeiro convidado, Carlos Pastoriza da Associação Brasileira da Industria da Maquinas e Equipamentos (ABIMAQ).  Mesmo que tem problemas nas duas outras áreas que mandaram representantes, aquela da indústria brasileira encara as mais dificuldades agora.

Pastoriza falou sobre o processo de desindustrialização silenciosa que está acabando com o processo de valor agregado aos produtos brasileiros.  As empresas podem começar a importar os produtos nas suas cadeias de abastecimento em vez de tê-los produzidos dentro do país.  Em si só acho que isso não é o problema mais grave, e pode levar a um processo de especialização para o país.  No entanto, num país tão grande, deve existir pelo menos múltiplos setores em que ele se especialize.

Outro problema na indústria brasileira é que a maquinaria é desatualizada.  Os trabalhadores brasileiros estão se esforçando muito mais dos que seus concorrentes estrangeiros embora com menos resultados.  Segundo Pastoriza, a idade média maquinaria no Brasil é 17 anos.  Isso está em comparação com a idade média maquinaria na Alemanha o que é 7 anos.  Na minha opinião, seria melhor vender a maquinaria a outros países não desenvolvidos e fazer uma compra em grande escala para apoiar alguns segmentos da indústria.

Eis nós vimos um ponto onde o Carlos Pastoriza não estava em pleno acordo com o Luiz Cornacchioni da Associação Brasileira do Agronegócio (ABAG).  Enquanto Pastoriza enfatizava fazer o país sistematicamente competitiva, Cornacchioni mencionava como é importante ter uma política industrial com regras estabelecidas e fixas que podem ser implementadas com clareza.  Até agora, as regras estabelecidas estão favorecendo a indústria agronegócio à consequência das outras, produzindo até o que pode ser referido como a doença holandesa.

Acho que se o país não escolher as industrias para que se especialize, o mundo faria a escolha para a país.  O que acontece nessa situação é que este país acaba a ter a última migalha do boicoto da indústria mundial.

Pastoriza também disse que sim a indústria agronegócio está tendo êxitos mas ainda deixa muito para desejar.  Ele preguntou por quê um país como o Brasil não é a cabeça da cadeia de agronegócio de alguns produtos como cacau.  Alguns países europeus podem produzir os melhores chocolates no mundo sem ter um grau de cacau produzido nas suas fronteiras.  Destaca dizer que essa é uma boa pergunta mas também vale a pena contar que a liderança do chocolate vem da uma política industrial bem definida, mas em acordo com o que disse Cornacchioni.

Aqui não falei muito da indústria de telecomunicações e o que disse a Sonia Amaro da PROTESTE Associação de Consumidores.   A razão para isso foi porque eu sabia o menos sobre os temas do que ela falou e também por causa do limite de tempo.

Logistics in 2050

This study was fueled by the need for corporate foresight, a business practice that z-punkt argues most companies do not actively employ.  Most businesses simply project forward by extrapolating from the status quo, without anticipating radical transformations that could occur.  This project discusses five possible evolutions for the Logistics & Supply Chains industry over the next 36 years (until 2050).

I found this study through Deutsche Post GA, a company who contributed resources and expertise in collaboration with z-punkt and an array of other participants.

The complete project can be found here.

The basic methodology evolves as follows as depicted by the flow chart on page 105.  Various factors were chosen and then assorted according to high or low uncertainty.  Their complexity was reduced through a process termed “environmental scanning”.

There are some striking possible changes for the logistics and supply chains industry, which could soon involve itself in the transfer of information and knowledge services, private security measurements, and direct involvement in A-Z industrial processes, all while employing new, non-traditional methods of transportation.  Logistics can either expand more radically on global proportions or become more heavily concentrated within sub regions, depending on the effects of globalization and climate change.

Warehouses may also return as the “just-in-time” production methods are phased out in favor of ensured security.  The same is true about timeliness.  Consumers may begin to value the longevity of products over the speed in which inferior products arrive at their homes.  Megacities may eventually only trade amongst themselves, leaving rural areas as dependencies.  The contrary may also occur, as new cities are constructed with better infrastructure and that are less prone to ecological disasters.   Rural infrastructure may be allowed to deteriorate, or contrarily preserved simply for use in emergency situations.  They also associate the involvement of international governing organizations with their ability to create sustainable economic developments globally.

Other interesting possibilities are the strengthening of regional trade blocs, which then use protectionist trade policies, only trading raw materials and data when necessary.  The Internet could also divide and be monitored regionally, and/or an Outernet could develop to facilitate global trade in commodities and new products made by Prosumers (where individuals are both the producers and consumers) are fabricated through 3D printers.

I encourage you to read the study in its entirety since by brief synopsis does not do it justice.

Hard-balling: Transportation Costs & Coal

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Disclaimer: I have no legal involvement in this case.  My opinion is formulated for no motive other than that to report on a case I found interesting.  I am primarily interested in the logistical aspects of this case and I do not discuss the legal details.  The denied appeal filed on June 21, 2013 can be found as Empire Trucking Company. v. Reading Anthracite Coal Company, 71 A.3d 923 (Pa.Super. 2013).  This is the direct link.

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The case highlights how businesses must play by the “rules of the game” (p. 20) and that Empire Trucking Company did successfully establish the elements that Reading Anthracite Coal Company made a tortuous interference with the contracts between Empire and its subcontractors.  Empire Trucking Company was recently awarded $271,000 in compensatory and $1,500,000 in punitive damages.

Context:

The situation began when fuel costs began to rise in 2000 and Empire Trucking Company (from now on “Empire”) began to apply a surcharge to cover their diesel fuel expenses on certain commodities that they hauled for Reading Anthracite Coal Company (from now on “Reading”).  Empire used subcontractors to do a sizable percentage of their work with Reading.  These subcontractors paid Empire 8% of their base trucking rates.

The new surcharge was applied only for hauling processed coal (as opposed to raw coal).  This charge was initially absorbed by Reading, who regained the cost when it was passed on to their customers.  Reading charged their customers the surcharge amount established by Empire in the form of “delivery costs”.  Empire only retained the surcharges if their own fleet had hauled the coal from Reading to the final destination.  Initially both Empire and Reading agreed on a set schedule for which to determine future fuel surcharges. 

By 2005, the surcharges had essentially disappeared, since the price of diesel had decreased.  However, in this same year, prices rose once again.  Surcharges were reinstated by Empire on deliveries of processed coal.  In April of 2005, Reading’s Director of Operations retired and was replaced by a new director.  This same month, Empire made an important change to their surcharge policy – now surcharges would apply to raw coal loads.

This impacted Reading’s profit margins since they could not pass on the surcharges for raw coal deliveries to its customers.  The proposed raw coal surcharge was set to be half of that applied to processed coal.

By August 2005, Empire stated that the surcharge applied to raw coal hauls would have to rise to 18%, a much higher percentage than initially established.  At this same time, the processed coal surcharge would rise to 23%.  This change was implemented on October 1, 2005.

On October 23, 2007 the surcharge applied to raw coal deliveries rose to match that on processed coals, effectively 23%.  As rates continued to rise in the Q2 of 2008, processed coal surcharges rose to become 53% of the total price of the cargo, while raw coal surcharges rose to a lesser degree, arriving at 33%.

Eventually, Reading’s profit sheets were reanalyzed by the company’s President.  An accountant (either internal or external) for Reading derived new estimates for past projected fuel expenses.  These estimates were a lot lower than those that Reading was charged by Empire.

This is the hard-ball moment:

Reading tried to recoup its losses by halting all payments (surcharges and base rates) to Empire (and consequentially to Empire’s subcontractors).  Empire paid its subcontractors only after it had received payments from Reading for deliveries.  Nonetheless, Empire and its subcontractors continued to make hauls for Reading for work in July and August 2008.  Not only did Reading not pay Empire, but it actually assured Empire that payments were pending.

Empire also transported processed coal only for two additional companies, Barakat and WMPI.  Unfortunately, the president of Reading was also the Secretary of Barakat and VP of WMPI.  Even though Empire continued to haul loads for these two other companies, payments were also halted by Barakat and WMPI.  Since these companies did not need raw coal transported, increased surcharges theoretically never hit their profit margins (assuming constant all other variables).  Therefore, they had no clear reason to stop payments to Empire at a time that coincided with Reading’s decisive action.

At the end of August 2008, Empire tells Reading that they can no longer afford to keep trucking coal.  Empire failed to tell their subcontractors to stop hauling coal for Reading.  Seizing the opportunity, Reading told Empire’s subcontractors that Empire had been paid all along, implying negligence on the part of Empire (not Reading).  This feeling of “animosity” helped sway Empire’s subcontractors to continue moving coal for Reading, but this time under Reading’s terms. 

By creating a situation of “financial distress” Reading was able to woe Empire’s subcontractors to haul both raw and processed coal directly for them, this time without the diesel fuel surcharges.  It is likely that these subcontractors were less able to absorb the complete absence of payments, and were in effect desperate for work.  They did not have the size or financial capacity to insulate themselves in situations such as these.

Regardless if Reading had initially devised to cut Empire out of the supply chain, the lesson should be noted.  In the future, the correct line of action would be to use your procurement department to determine if delivery costs can actually be effectively reduced.